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Case No. 10696 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MYRTLE FLEWELLING CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HAROLD ELWOOD CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff and defendant were married January 
22, 1964. Pleadings and T-4. Plaintiff had been previously 
married and widowed, T-4. Defendant had children by 
prior marriage, T-5. The plaintiff was 61 (in error being 
68) years of age, T-11. Defendant was 67 years of age, 
T-11. No children were born to them nor are any expected. 
The plaintiff's action seeking a divorce was dated 
March 3, 1965. On the same day the defendant signed an 
appearance and waiver and the parties signed a stipulation 
in which each released claims against the property of the 
other and the plaintiff waived all alimony (paragraph 7). 
It is further provided that the defendant pay the plaintiff 
$5,000.00 by transferring monies in a savings account 
and accrued benefits in Fireman's Credit Union (paragraph 
2). Withdrawal instruments were signed by the defendant 
and the funds within a few days of March 3 were delivered 
to the plaintiff. 
The defendant on March 12 filed an answer and 
counter-claim. Neither the answer nor the counter-claim 
referred to the stipulation nor asked relief from its 
provisions. 
The cause came on for trial September 30, 1965, with 
the parties and counsel present. The Court inquired, "Is 
there any contest on the divorce?", to which defendant's 
counsel answered "No, sir," and at T-3 the Court said: 
"There is no contest on the issues for the grounds of 
divorce." Mr. Patterson: "That's right, your Honor". 
The plaintiff then testified in support of her allega-
tion of mental cruelty. No effort was made to cross 
examine the plaintiff concerning her cause of action, and 
the Court indicated that she had shown a prima facie case 
of cruelty, and "I'll grant a divorce on those grounds," T-9. 
Testimony was then offered that Mr. Christensen 
moved into the home owned by Mrs. Christensen which 
was fully furnished. That he brought an old car, and that 
the plaintiff owned an automobile. That she withdrew 
money and paid her own expenses on the honeymoon, T-8. 
That the plaintiff lost social security benefits of $80.00 
per month, T-10. The balance of the hearing is principally 
statements of counsel to the Court with the Court recessing 
the proceedings with the observations made at T-13 and 
14. 
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The transcript does not indicate any instructions 
concerning the submission of briefs, but reference is made 
to them in the minute entry entered in said cause under 
the date of September 30, 1965. 
The Court's determination to reject the stipulation 
without pleadings or testimony attacking it, together with 
a misunderstanding of plaintiff's counsel in a conversation 
had with the Court prompted the plaintiff to file her 
affidavit of prejudice. ln counsel's conversation with the 
Court, counsel erroneously concluded that the judge was 
reluctant to continue in the trial of said cause, and that 
if an affidavit of prejudice were filed that this cause 
would be assigned to another department of the court. 
On order assigning the case to another judge for trial was 
submitted on hearing denied and went unsigned. 
Plaintiff's counsel, anticipating the transfer, filed no 
memorandum of authorities within the time allotted. There-
upon the defendant moved the Court to enter an order 
finding the issues of law reserved by the Court in the 
defendant's favor. Hearing on said motion was had on 
the 15th day of November, 1965, after which the Court 
extended to plaintiff an opportunity within ten days to 
file his memorandum for the assistance of the Court. Such 
memorandum was filed, with the defendant's counsel filing 
an answering brief. 
On receipt of counsel's brief, the Court, having deemed 
the matter to be under advisement awaiting briefs, entered 
its memorandum decision on the 4th day of January, 1966, 
as the same appears in the files herein. 
Being advised that a reconciliation was under con-
sideration by the parties, plaintiff's counsel did not prepare 
any findings of fact nor conclusions of law. That there-
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upon the defendant submitted to the Court his findings 
of fact and conclusions of law which were signed by the 
Court on the 11th day of March, 1966, although the plaintiff 
did not receive a copy of said findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, or decree until the 15th day of March, 1966. 
Plaintiff then filed her objections to the memorandum 
decision; a motion for an order vacating the entry of the 
defendant's findings, and a motion for the entry of plain-
tiff's findings. The defendant made objections to the plain-
tiff's findings. 
Thereafter the Court, under the date of March 17, 
1966, signed the plaintiff's findings and entered an order 
vacating the entry of the defendant's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
Thereafter on May 2, 1966, the Court with counsel 
indicated its dissatisfaction with the plaintiff's findings, 
indicated that questions concerning the plaintiff's and 
defendant's properties were not fully gone into at the time 
of the trial, and continued the matter for further hearing 
"for the sole purpose of receiving testimony concerning 
the property and the value of the property of the parties." 
The transcript of proceedings, May 2, 1966, P-2. 
Thereafter on June 24, 1966, further hearing was had 
in said matter. At said hearing, the defendant offered 
testimony concerning the value of the properties of the 
parties, and the plaintiff made proffers of proof. 
The Court thereupon entered its or<ler affirming its 
previous memorandum of decision and directing the de-
fendant's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree 
be entered as the judgment in said cause. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks a reversal of that portion of the 
judgment requiring the plaintiff to return $3,500.00 of 
the $5,000.00 paid to the plaintiff by the defendant under 
the Stipulation signed by the parties and seeks to have 
this Court enter its own order approving the Stipulation 
and authorizing the retention by the plaintiff of the 
$5,000.00 paid to her under the Stipulation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: 
ERROR OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CONTINUING 
TO HEAR AND DETERMINE THE ISSUES IN SAID 
CAUSE AFTER THE FILING OF AN AFFIDAVIT OF 
PREJUDICE UNDER RULES 63 (B) U.R.C.P. 
Anderson vs. Anderson 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P 2nd 264 
the Court on page 265 commented on a situation where 
an Affidavit of Prejudice had been filed against the trial 
judge and said as follows, 
"If the rule means anything at all it means that 
what is plainly stated to the effect that the Judge 
against whom the Affidavit of Bias and Prejudice 
thereafter cannot proceed to hear the issue himself. 
Our only conclusion is that any order of judgment 
.based on evidence thereafter taken by him would 
be ineffective against the affiant. It follows that 
this case must be remanded for another trial of the 
issues." 
POINT II 
ERROR OF THE COURT IN CHANGING THE STIP-
ULATION OF THE PARTIES WHEN: 
5 
A. THE STIPULATION WAIVED ALIMONY AND 
WAS A PROPERTY SETTLEMENT. 
B. WHEN THE PLAINTIFF DlD NOT CHAL-
LENGE THE STIPULATION NOR SEEK ANY DE-
PARTURE FROM IT. 
C. WHEN THE DEFENDANT DID NOT CHAL-
LENGE THE STIPULATION BY PLEADINGS NOR 
OFFER ANY TESTIMONY THAT THE SAME WAS 
NOT ACCEPTABLE NOR THAT THE SAME WAS 
OBTAINED BY FRAUD, DURESS, OR MISREPRE-
SENTATION. 
The power of the Court to change the stipulated pro-
visions of the parties regarding alimony and support money 
is generally conceded based upon public policy considera-
tions, See 
Barraclough vs. Barraclough, 111 P 2d 792 - 100 U 196 
Callister vs. Callister, 261 P 2d 944 - UCA Section 
30-3-4 
Jones vs. Jones, 139 P 2d 222 - 104 U 275 
Madsen vs. Madsen, 27G P 2d 917 - 2 Utah 2d 423 
24 Am J ur 2d Section 670 
So far as counsel has b€€n able to find, this Court has 
never been called upon to answer the following proposition. 
Does the Court have discretion to change a stipulated 
property settlement agreement without provisions for ali-
money or support money where the defendant does not by 
pleadings or testimony show the same to be unfair or to 
have been procured by undue intluence, fraud or misrepre-
sentation. 
In the Hall case, (177 P 2d 731) a property settlement 
was presented to the Court which provided that the de-
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fendant pay to the wife $65.00 per month in semi-monthly 
payments. The defendant did not answer nor appear. At 
the hearing where the plaintiff testified that the sum 
was reasonable for her support and that her husband was 
earning $150.00 per rnonth. The Court struck from the 
findings the figure of $65.00 and changed it to $80.00 
per month. The defendant became delinquent on the basis 
of the $80.00 per month whereupon the plaintiff filed an 
affidavit alleging the arrearage. The defendant was found 
in contempt for failure to pay the $80.00 per month. From 
this contempt finding an appeal was taken. 
The Stipulation signed by the parties was specific in 
several aspects. 
a. It is provided that the award to the plaintiff shall 
be a property settlement of all claims against the 
defendant. 
b. There was no provision for periodic payment. 
c. There was no provision for alimony but rather a 
provision that the payment was in lieu of alimony. 
d. The settlement was a lump sum and was accepted 
in lieu of alimony support money or loss of social 
security payments. 
e. It released claims against each other's property 
together ·with all other claims including promises made 
prior to the marriage, obligations accruing during the 
marriage, or subsequent thereto. 
f. Settlement money was paid and partly spent. 
Admittedly, tlte Courts have under public policy con-
siderations: 
a. Ignored the label put on the property settlement 
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Ross vs. Ross, 403 P 2d 19 
b. Found periodic property settlement prov1s10ns to 
have been alimony, 24 Am Jur Section 670. 
c. Modified property settlement provisions where parts 
of the Stipulation made provision for alimony, 24 Am 
Jur Section 670. 
Conceding the desirability of such public policy there 
would still seem to be equally as important a public policy 
for the Court not to over ride the obvious contractual 
desires and provisions of parties desiring to settle between 
themselves the financial side of their separation. Certainly 
this should not be done until it has been established that 
the Stipulation was improperly obtained. 
In the Hall case, page 733: "It is true that we have held 
that a Stipulation for an alimony settlement is only a 
recommendation from the Court." See Jones vs. Jones 104 
Utah 275 139 P 2d 222, "But we did not mean by that that 
it was to be given no weight at all. Lacking any proof to 
the contrary the lower Court could assume that the parties 
best know their own financial standing and capabilities 
and accept their Stipulation for its face value unless the 
Court Records before the Court obviously indicate that 
to accept the Stipulation would not accomplish equity. To 
ignore the wishes of the parties without grounds for doing 
so clearly is an arbitrary and capricious act." The judg-
ment of contempt was reversed. 
In the Mathie case, (363, P 2d 779 12 Utah 2d 116,) 
following a prior divorce suit, the parties entered into a 
reconciliation agreement. In a second subsequent action 
the plaintiff did not seek alimony or support money, and 
none was awarded, but the Court generally followed the 
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pattern set by the parties in the reconciliation agreement. 
The appeal was taken attacking the disposition of the 
property. The Court makes rather an extensive review 
of the authorities but notes "However, we are not disposed 
to disagree with the proposition that where neither spouse 
is in a position of undue disadvantage and they voluntarily 
enter into a contract which affects their rights only, it 
should be regarded as presumptively valid, and the Court 
should give it effect unless there are persuasive reasons 
for doing otherwise." 
In Adams vs. Adams 177 P 2d page 265, the parties 
had reached a stipulation providing for the division of 
their property and for the payment of alimony for 18 months 
only and support for a minor child. The plaintiff indicated 
her acceptance of the stipulation and her counsel noted 
the negotiations preceding the settlement. Despite this th~ 
Court refused to approve the property settlement, directed 
the plaintiff to file an amended complaint seeking a great-
er sum. The defendant refused to stipulate the change and 
after default the Court entered an order for the larger 
sum consistent with his notions. The defendant appealed, 
contending that the property settlement is valid in the 
absence of a finding; that it is inequitable or was procured 
by fraud or compulsion and should have been approved 
by the trial Court. 
The Court analyzes three categories of support and 
maintenance provisions noting a third category where 
the wife by contract waives all support and maintenance. 
The Court on page 267 notes as follows. "Property settle-
ment agreements occupy a favored position in the law of 
this state and are sanctioned by the Civil Code." "When 
the parties have finally agreed upon the division of their 
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property, the Courts are loath to disturb their agreement 
except for equitable considerations. A property settlement 
agreement, therefore, that is not tainted by fraud or com-
pulsion or is not in violation of the confidential relationship 
of the parties is valid and binding on the court." 
"If the contract was not fradulent when made, and 
there was no violation of the confidential relationship, it 
will be binding on the Court and there can be no modifica-
tion of the payments after the decree without the consent 
of the parties." The Court notes on page 269: "If her con-
sent to the agreement was procured through fraud or com-
pulsion, or if circumstances are such that the Court finds 
the agreement inequitable, the Court may withhold approval 
of the agreement ... since nothing was shown to indicate 
that the agreement was inequitable, the parties are bound 
by the agreement." 
For the Court without a challenge from either party 
by pleadings or testimony challenging the manner in which 
the Stipulation was obtained to arbitrarily impose new 
terms upon the parties was an abuse of discretion. Alexan-
der vs. Alexander 199 P 2d 348 and Halloway vs. Halloway, 
179 P 2d 22 held that a property settlement agreement con-
taining provisions for support and maintenance of wife 
as part of the division of property of the parties is binding 
on the trial court in absence of fraud, duress, undue in-
fluence, violation of confidential relation, or other circum-
stances showing the agreement to be inequitable, and after 
approval of trial court, such provisions cannot be modified 
by the Court without consent of the parties. 
The binding effect of a wife's contractual waiver of 
alimony must be recognized unless appropriate procedures 
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are envoked to avoid the waiver. See Cockrum vs. Cockrum, 
328 p 2d 1000. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT SO CLEARLY ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION THAT THIS COURT SHOULD SUBSTI-
TUTE ITS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT AND ORDER JUDGMENT ENTERED PROVID-
ING THAT THE PLAINTIFF RETAIN ALL OF THE 
$5,000.00 PAID HER UNDER THE STIPULATION. 
Despite the advantages generally felt to exist in the 
trial Court and this Court's disposition to affirm if there 
is any evidence to sustain the position taken by the trial 
Court, this Court has the right to substitute its judgment 
for that of the trial Court under proper circumstances. 
See Wilson case, 296 P 2d 977 5 Utah 2d 79, where the 
Court said on page 981 as follows, "It is true as defend-
ant contends, that a divorce proceeding is equitable and 
that it is within the prerogative of this Court to review the 
evidence and to substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial Court under proper circumstances." See also, Curry 
vs. Curry, 321 P 2d 93~ 7 Utah 2d 198, where this Court 
reduced the period over which the defendant was required 
to pay alimony. 
POINT IV 
REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE 
PLAINTIFF'S PROFFERS OF PROOF. 
The Court's memorandum decision contains the state-
ment "The plaintiff, however, having considerable more 
property than the defendant" was a finding reached 
by the Court without any testimony supporting it. The 
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plaintiff complained of this in her objections to the mem-
orandum decision. To reach this objection, the Court 
scheduled the second hearing for "the sole purpose of 
receiving testimony concerning the property and the value 
of the property of the parties." 
The plaintiff offered to prove the cost to her of a 
single premium no reserve or terminal fund annuity which 
would provide the benefits of her social security loss by 
the marriage and also the amount of $5,000.00 received 
by her that remained unspent. These were in view of the 
plaintiff, proper testimony concerning "the property of 
the parties." While its receipt would not likely have changed 
the Court's view, the same should have been received in 
·evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should on its own initiative order the 
decree modified to permit the plaintiff to retain the 
$5,000.00 paid her under the Stipulation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLENN W. ADAMS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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